










WHY LEWIS’, SHOGENJI’S AND FITELSON’S NOTIONS OF COHERENCE CANNOT BE ACCEPTED

In this paper, I show that Lewis’ definition of coherence and Fitelson’s and Shogenji’s measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted.
C. I. Lewis (1946) has defined a coherent (or congruent)1 set of statements as follows:

A set of statements, or a set of supposed facts asserted, will be said to be [... coherent] if and only if they are so related that the antecedent probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder of the set can be assumed as given premises. (338).

This quotation can be rephrased into the following precise definition of coherence:

(LC) If E is a set of beliefs B1, ..., Bn, E is coherent if and only if, for any Bi  E, Pr(BiCi) > Pr(Bi), where Ci is the conjunction of E’s all members excluding Bi. 

	Although (LC) may prove intuitively plausible, I will now show that it is affected by a fatal difficulty. The proof requires some preliminary. Ken Akiba (2003) has introduced an epistemological principle according to which:

(Stability)	[The coherence degree of any] set of beliefs remains [… unchanged] if the believer does not add any essentially new information to the set, or drop any old information from it. (1).

While such a general principle might be questioned (see below), a specific consequence of it strikes me as very plausible; namely:

(Stability*) 	Any coherent set of beliefs cannot be turned into non-coherent, and any non-coherent set of beliefs cannot be turned into coherent, if the believer does not add any essentially new information to the set, or drop any old information from it.

It is not absurd to maintain that the coherence degree of our sets of beliefs cannot be fixed with precision and once and for all so that it can oscillate among different values independently of the acquisition of essentially new data. Oscillations could well be an effect of re-arrangements and formal manipulations of the beliefs that one already has. Yet, if oscillations were so drastic that coherence could be turned into non-coherence and vice versa even in absence of essentially new information, any significant correlation between the coherence of our beliefs and the state of the outside world would definitively be lost. In that case, the notion of coherence would be deprived of most of its epistemological relevance. Additionally, if we could lose and gain coherence cheaply, by simply manipulating the beliefs that we already have, even the coarse fact that our beliefs are coherent or non-coherent could not provide the slightest support for our decisions. Coherence could have no role in our rational choices. The sensible conclusion is – I believe – that a notion of coherence unable to fulfil (Stability*) can hardly be considered an epistemic virtue.2
I call two sets of beliefs E and E* equivalent if and only if, for any B  E, E* entails B, and for any B*  E*, E entails B*. If E and E* are equivalent, E can be turned into E* and vice versa by mere formal transformations. Consequently, a subject can move from the state of information described by E to the state of information described by E* and vice versa without adding any essentially new information or dropping any old information. (Stability*) therefore entails:

(Equi-coherence)	If E and E* are equivalent sets of beliefs, E is coherent if and only if E* is coherent.

If we accept (Stability*) – and I urge we should – we accept (Equi-coherence).
	Lewis’ definition of coherence (LC) proves fatally flawed because the conjunction of (LC) and (Equi-coherence) entails both these statements:

(1) For any set of beliefs E such that 0 < Pr(E) < 1,3 if E coherent, then E is not coherent.
 
(2) For any set of beliefs E such that 0 < Pr(E) < 1, if E is not coherent, then E is coherent.

The problem is that the conjunction of (1) and (2) entails the following contradiction:

(3) For any set of beliefs E such that 0 < Pr(E) < 1, E is coherent and not coherent at the same time.

	Proof of (1). Consider any set of beliefs E = {B1, ..., Bn} with 0 < Pr(E) < 1 and such that E is coherent on (LC). For any such E, it is always possible to construct the equivalent set E* = {B1 & ... & Bn, B  ~B}. Although E satisfies (LC), E* does not, as Pr(B1 & ... & BnB  ~B) = Pr(B1 & ... & Bn). Since E and E* are equivalent and E* is not coherent on (LC), given (Equi-coherence), E is not coherent on (LC) either. QED.
	Proof of (2). Consider any set of beliefs E = {B1, ..., Bn} with 0 < Pr(E) < 1 and such that E is not coherent on (LC). For any such E, it is always possible to construct the equivalent set E* = {B1 & ... & Bn, Bi} with Bi  E and Pr(Bi) < 1. Although E does not satisfy (LC), E* does. In fact, 0 < Pr(B1 & ... & Bn) < 1, Pr(Bi) < 1 and  B1 & ... & Bn entails Bi, thus Pr (BiB1 & ... & Bn) > Pr(Bi) and Pr(B1 & ... & BnBi) > Pr(B1 & ... & Bn). Since E and E* are equivalent and E* is coherent on (LC), given (Equi-coherence), E proves coherent on (LC) too. QED.
	Proof that (1) and (2) entail (3). The proof exemplifies a formal paradox with the following form: P or not-P. Assume P. Then not-P. Assume not-P. Then P. Thus P and not-P. Consider any set of beliefs E such that 0 < Pr(E) < 1. E is coherent or not coherent. Assume that E is coherent. Given (1), E is not coherent. Assume that E is not coherent. Given (2), E is coherent. Thus, whether E is coherent or not coherent, E is coherent and not coherent. In conclusion, given (1) and (2), any set of beliefs E such that 0 < Pr(E) < 1 proves coherent and non-coherent at the same time. QED.4
	My argument shows that the conjunction of (LC) and (Equi-coherence) entails the contradiction that any set of beliefs in general5 is coherent and not coherent at the same time. (Equi-coherence) and (LC) are thus formally inconsistent. Since (Equi-coherence) is very plausible, (LC) must be dropped. As a result, Lewis’ definition of coherence is unacceptable.
	Independently of the difficulty resting on (1), (2) and (3), a recurrent complaint about (LC) is that it does not account for widespread conviction that coherence comes in degrees. Precisely, the claim is that the coherence of sets of beliefs should be evaluated on the basis of a measure rather than a qualitative definition like (LC). Shogenji 1999 and Fitelson 2003 have proposed two measures of coherence. The hope might be that these two functions escape the fatal difficulty affecting (LC). In the remaining pages, I will however show that this is not the case: either measures, when conjoined with (Equi-coherence), entail both (1) and (2). Thus they prove as paradoxical as (LC).




CS intuitively measures the degree by which the beliefs B1, ..., Bn are more probable to be true together than they would be if they were related neutrally, namely, if the truth of one belief had no consequence on the truth of any other. The set {B1, ..., Bn} proves coherent/incoherent if and only if the ratio is higher/lower than 1; the set is neither coherent not incoherent if the ratio is equal to 1. (Cf. 340).
	CS has been criticised by Akiba 20006 and Fitelson 2003. I will consider some of these objections below. Here, I will just show that the simultaneous use of CS and (Equi-coherence) entails both (1) and (2). This implies that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent on CS at the same time, which is absurd. Since CS and (Equi-coherence) are inconsistent and the latter is very plausible, CS must be rejected.
	Proof of (1). Let us consider any set of beliefs E = {B1, ... Bn} with 0 < Pr(E) < 1 and such that CS(B1, ... Bn) > 1  (namely, E is coherent on CS). For any such E, it is always possible to construct a set E* = {B1 & ... & Bn, B  ~B}. E and E* are equivalent. Notice however that, since (B1 & ... & Bn) & (B  ~B) is logically equivalent to B1 & ... & Bn and Pr(B  ~B) = 1, the numerator and denominator of the ratio of CS are identical. Thus CS(B1 & ... & Bn, B  ~B) = 1; which means that E* is not coherent on CS. Since E and E* are equivalent and E* is not coherent on CS, given (Equi-coherence), E is not coherent on CS either. QED.
	Proof of (2). Let us consider any set of beliefs E = {B1, ... Bn} with 0 < Pr(E) < 1 and such that CS(B1, ... Bn) ≤ 1 (namely, E is not coherent on CS). For any such E, it is always possible to construct a set E* = {B1 & ... & Bn, Bi} with Bi  E and Pr(Bi) < 1. E and E* are equivalent. Notice however that, since 0 < Pr(B1 & ... & Bn) < 1, Pr(Bi) < 1 and B1 & ... & Bn entails Bi, then Pr(BiB1 & ... & Bn) > Pr(Bi). Consequently, CS(B1 & ... & Bn, Bi) > 1. Thus E* proves coherent on CS. Since E and E* are equivalent and E* is coherent on CS, given (Equi-coherence), E is coherent on CS too. QED.7




E is positively or negatively dependent if and only if each of its members is, respectively, positively or negatively supported by all remaining members and their conjunctions. E is independent if and only if each of its members is neither positively nor negatively supported by all remaining members and their conjunctions. E is coherent if and only if CF(E) > 0, and E is not coherent in all other cases.








	To define CF, Fitelson introduces the set S, where S = {{F(Bi, X)x  Pi}Bi  E} (Cf.: 196). For instance, if E ={B1, B2, B3}, S = {F(B1, B2), F(B1, B3), F(B1, B2 & B3), F(B2, B1), F(B2, B3), F(B1, B2 & B3), F(B3, B2), F(B3, B1), F(B3, B1 & B2)}. If E ={B1, B2}, S = {F(B1, B2), F(B2, B1)}.
	C is finally defined as follows (195):

	CF(E) =df mean(S). 

That is, CF is the straight average of S. It is easy to see that CF satisfies (1). 
	Fitelson’s measure of coherence is apparently more accurate than Shogenji’s. For instance, while CS makes the coherence degree of a set of beliefs E depend on the probabilistic correlations existing among each Bi  E and E\{Bi}, CL makes it depend, more exhaustively, on the probabilistic correlations among each Bi  E and any proper subset of E\{Bi}. (Cf.: 196). Besides, as Akiba (2000) has argued, when B1 entails B2, CS makes the coherence degree of {B1, B2} depend on only B2’s prior probability, which appears inaccurate. In contrast, CF makes such a coherence degree depend on the precise probabilistic correlations between B1 and B2 (whenever B1 and B2 are contingent). (Cf. Fitelson 2003: 197). For further examples see: 196-198.
	Although Fitelson’s measure of coherence is more sophisticated and thus apparently less vulnerable than Shogenji’s, it falls afoul of the same paradox. For the conjunction of CF and (Equi-coherence) entails both (1) and (2). This implies that any set of beliefs in general proves coherent and non-coherent on CF at the same time,  which is absurd.




Pr(B1 & ... & Bn) > 0, consequently, the denominator of this ratio is always greater than 0, while its numerator of is always equal to 0. Therefore F(B1 & ... & Bn, B  ~B) = 0. Let us now calculate the value of F(B  ~B, B1 & ... & Bn). Since B  ~B is a necessary truth and B1 & ... & Bn is contingent, it follows from by F’s definition that F(B  ~B, B1 & ... & Bn) = 0. Thus, CF(E*) = mean(S) = 0. E* is not coherent on CF. Since E and E* are equivalent and E* is not coherent on CS, given (Equi-coherence), E is not coherent on CF either. QED








Again, the denominator of this ratio is always greater than 0. Since Pr(BiB1 & ... & Bn) = 1, the least value this ratio can have is 0 – this happens if Pr(Bn~(B1 & ... & Bn)) = 1. In conclusion, since F(B1 & ... & Bn, Bi) ≥ 0 and F(Bi, B1 & ... & Bn) > 0, CF(E*) = mean(S) > 0. Thus E* does prove coherent on CF. Since E and E* are equivalent and E* is coherent on CF, given (Equi-coherence), E proves coherent on CF as well. QED.





 Lewis prefers to use ‘congruence’ to ‘coherence’ to distinguish himself from the British idealists advocates of the ‘coherence theory of truth’.
2 This argument for (Stability*) is nothing but an adapted re-formulation of Akiba’s original argument for (Stability). Cf. 2003: 4.
3 I assume here and henceforth that ‘E’ in Pr(E) stands for the logical conjunction of E’s all members.
4 I am very grateful to Akiba for suggesting this sharp formulation of the problem.
5 Notice that sets of beliefs whose prior probability is 0 or 1 are just limiting cases.
6 See also Shogenji’s answer to Akiba in Shogenji 2001. 
7 Shogenji (2001) has provided an argument concluding that, in coherentist epistemology ‘when beliefs have different sources, we cannot treat them as a single conjunctive belief’. (150). This means that, whenever beliefs B1, ..., Bn have different sources, the set {B1, ..., Bn} is not equivalent to {B1 & ... & Bn} or {B1& … & Bn, B  ~B}. I think that this claim will strike most of us as strongly counterintuitive. Furthermore, Shogenji does not argue for the truth of his argument’s premises (cf.: 150); consequently, they appear arbitrarily assumed. Finally, those premises just concern particular examples of coherence evaluation (cf.: 150), thus they cannot entail Shogenji’s general conclusion.
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